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This paper has three goals:
1. To describe the relationship between values, facts and norms. 
2. To consider if norms are a constituent part of the essence of values.
3. To define the boundaries of the axiology.
To reach these goals i will present an historical-phenomenological reconstruction of the 
relationship between values, norms and fact. Starting from Brentano and his school i will 






This paper has three goals:
1. To describe the relationship between values, facts and norms. 
2. To consider if norms are a constituent part of the essence of 
values.
3. To define the boundaries of the axiology.
To reach these goals i will present an historical-phenomenological 
reconstruction of the relationship between values, norms and fact.starting 
from Brentano and his school i will focus on those disciples that directly 
or indirectly borrowed and improved Brentano’s idea of analogy. The main 
tenet of this paper addresses the analysis of the two-tiered analogy that 
Brentano assumed to be within the field of values. In his The foundation and 
Construction of ethics (1952). Brentano emphasizes the role that the analogy 
played between the true and the good in order to describe the axiological 
essence of the good.1 The analogy he describes is built on a two-tiered level: 
1. The analogy between axiology and ontology
2. The analogy between values and the true
The first level of the analogy between the value’s essence and the being 
of the object, and the second level between the value and the true. in this 
paper i aim to prove the following: the essence of values is rooted in the 
practical intentionality of the subject and the ought cannot create a norm 
with regard to how we should practically intend objects. rather, the norm 
can describe how a thing should be in order to be represented in a truthful 
way. from this perspective, normativity seems to belong to the logical realm 
rather than to the practical one, bridging and blurring the two tiers of the 
analogy via the means of the representation and the description.
Therefore, in my paper i will prove on the one hand that normativity is a 
layer that comes ‘after’ the value, thus describing what i will call the second 
layer of the analogy. on the other hand values, being completely independent 
1  Brentano, f. 1952. The foundation and Construction of ethics, e. hughes schneewind (ed.), 
london: routledge london, 1973 (original: Brentano, f. 1952. grundlegung und aufbau der ethik, 
meiner felix Verlag).
VAlUes, NORMATIVITy AND fACTs




of normativity, can be described as a practical intention that relates to what 
we feel to be right, though not always in a predicative and conscious way.
from aristotle until modern times axiology has not been considered 
as an autonomous discipline, but as belonging to ethics and morality, 
because it had the task to shape the customs and the way people think. 
with Brentano’s psychology something began to change, although “in the 
twentieth century the term axiology was apparently first applied by Paul 
lapie” (logique  de  la  Volonte,  1902)  and  E. von  Hartmann  (grundriss  der 
axiology,  1908).”  With Brentano axiology became an autonomous discipline 
and we can look to Brentano as the legitimate father of modern axiology2. in 
fact, in his Psychology from empirical Viewpoint (1874)he developed the basis of 
an axiology that was not, on one hand, related to facts and was, on the other 
hand, rooted in sentiments. Brentano was one of the first to remark upon 
the difference between the object and the value (Sacheand Wertobject) and 
the analogy between values and logical truths.
As it concerns the first point, his theory of intentionality lead him to notice that 
the object, as we intend it, is not the same as the object that exists in reality. 
our pointing to (tendere in) an object places us in the condition to perceive the 
object in two different ways: (i) as something that in-exists in our mind and (ii) 
as something that exists external to or independent of our perception. The same 
can be said with values. There are values that exist outside of us in their wholeness 
with objects and there are values that (‘in’-)exist in our mind as pure values in 
themselves. These two groups of objects can differ from each other because the 
latter, that is the axiological units, are lacking an ontological property. They are 
axiological essences that are rooted in sentiments and need to be described.
“[every conscious act] includes within it a consciousness of itself. Therefore 
every [conscious] act, no matter how simple, has a double object, a primary 
and a secondary object. The simplest act, for example of hearing, has as its 
primary object the sound, and for its secondary object, itself, the mental 
phenomenon in which the sound is heard.”3
“in discovering this love within ourselves we recognize the object not only 
as being loved and lovable, but also as being worthy of love.”4
2 d.d.  T. runes, The  dictionary  of  Philosophy,  new york: Philosophical library new york, 1942.
3  Brentano, f. 1874. Psychology from the empirical Standpoint, rancurello, Terrell, and 
mcalister (trs.) 1973. london: routledge. (original: Brentano, f. 1874. Psychologie von 
einemempirischenStandpunkt, leipzig.), pp.153-4.
4 ibid., p. 132.
VAlUes, NORMATIVITy AND fACTs







From both these quotes it is possible to follow Brentano’s statements 
concerning the relationship between the ontological existence of the object 
as something that is posed outside of us, and the mental object that exists in 
our mind as a mental phenomenon.
Values, as mental phenomena, exist in our mind and can be given to the 
subject via the device of representation. in fact Brentano divides acts 
into three categories: presentations, judgements and the sentiments of 
hate and love. objects are given to consciousness according to these three 
modes. They do not have to be taken as three distinct classes though. 
Being the most important category presentation, for example, grounds 
any other act. we present things each time we are (intentionally) directed 
towards an object, be it that we are imagining, seeing, remembering, or 
expecting it. The two other categories, judgments and the phenomena or the 
sentiments of love and hate, are based on presentations. with a judgment 
we accept or deny the existence of the presented object. Thus a judgment is 
a presentation, plus a qualitative mode of acceptance or denial. The third 
category, which Brentano names “phenomena of love and hate,” comprises 
emotions, feelings, desires and acts of will. with these acts we have positive 
or negative feelings towards an object, though such acts need the first 
category of presentations in order to exist in the mind of the subject.
with his work on axiology Brentano aimed to achieve something similar to  
what aristotle strove to achieve with logic, i.e. an analytic of pure values. 
in fact, according to Brentano, truths and values have similar properties 
that enable the second layer of analogy. That is, the layer between value and 
the true or judgments and sentiments. indeed, belonging to the second 
category of mental phenomena, truths are founded on cognitive reason and 
are stated by judgements, whereas values are grounded in the sentiment of 
love and hate and are expressed by practical acts of interest. “The predicate 
moral (...) is similar to the predicate true.”5
Brentano is interested in the description of aristotelian orexis or the 
medieval problem of voluntas sine affectus. according to Brentano, values 
are connected to emotions, in particular the sentiments of love and hate. 
a value is what is desired or not desired within an act and there can be 
a primary and secondary value depending on whether or not we desire 
something in itself or for the use we can do of it. as such, emotional acts 
5 foundation, p. 286.
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can be distinguished as either correct and incorrect. This means that if 
i love something that i desire, i am apparently feeling something that is 
correct. according to Brentano both judgements and interests obey to the 
cartesian criterion of evidence. we have no doubt about judging something 
that is transparently evident and therefore absolutely true. we can behave 
in the same way when we love something and when the object of our love 
is clearly evident. Therefore it is certain that that sentiment of love that 
we are feeling is good or correct. Consequently, for Brentano, correctness 
has the same essence as a mathematical operation. The primary good/bad 
is that which is correct to love or to hate as an end in itself. different from 
the judgement, interest is that by which we recognize the correctness of 
what we feel holds an objective scale and proportion. This means that the polarity 
between good and bad accepts gradations that are not tolerated in the 
polarity between the true and the false. 
Hence, the first analogy posed by Brentano shows the parallelism between 
the object and the value held by the object. The second analogy recognizes 
the parallelism between the true and value, though the value works on this 
sense of evidence and scale that cannot be appreciated in judgments.
The motives of this analogy can be found also in the work of other scholars 
that are directly and indirectly influenced by the school of Brentano6. 
among such scholars we can mention the names of ehrenfels and meinong, 
who only developed the former sense of the analogy and husserl who 
improved both layers.
On the one hand, both Ehrenfels and Meinong maintain Brentano’s first layer of 
analogy between ontology and axiology. for them, value resides in a sentiment. 
according to ehrenfels, in his System der Wertlehre (1897), value is grounded in a 
desire. “We desire things not  because we  comprehend some ineffable quality 
‘value’ in them but we ascribe value to  them because we desire them.”7
6  Among the authors operating in an indirect way within the atmosphere of Brentano’s 
school who were followers of his disciples we can cite ehrenfels (meinong’s follower), Kraus 
(Marty’s follower), Scheler and Hartmann, Ingarden and Kotarbiński. Authors such as Calderoni, 
Perri, Prall and stevenson clearly worked within the framework of the Brentanian school, though 
they cannot be considered as institutional members.
7 ehrenfels, c. (1897), “system der wertlehre”, Werttheorie, ed. by f. reinhard, muenchen: 
Philosophia 1982.
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for meinong, in his Zurgrundlegung der allgemeinenWertlehre (1923),8 value is 
grounded in feeling. he is aware of the referential meaning of our emotions and 
includes judgments as a necessary presupposition of every value experience.9
on the other hand, moore and husserl work on both of Brentano’s layers of 
analogy, transforming it into an outright parallelism. moore, for example 
arrived at the same results as Brentano, reading Brentano’s work only after his 
Principia ethica (1903). In Moore’s axiology there are two areas of intrinsic value: 
“personal affections and aesthetic enjoyments include all the greatest, and by 
far the greatest, goods we can imagine.”10.as in Brentano’s famous lecture on 
ethics, The Origin of the Knowledge of right and Wrong (1903) reviewed by Moore 
in 1903, there is for Moore a parallel between ethics and logic. “What truth is 
for logic, the good is for ethics.”11in the paper entitled ‘the nature of Judgment’ 
(1899), moore understands the nature of judgement to be the central issue 
because, for him, truth is independent of the judging and thinking mind. Truth 
relates to the object of judgement, not to the judgement as act.
“Because there is no distinction between states of affairs or objects in a 
certain state, on the one hand, and propositions, on the other hand, there is 
nothing to which the proposition could correspond to make it true”12. 
 
for moore truth, as well as good, is a primitive, unanalysable notion. 
8 meinong, von a. (1923) “Zur grundlegung der allgemeinen wertlehre” in Zurgrundlegung der 
allgemeinen Werttheorie, ed. e. mally, graz: leuschner and lubensky, 1923.
9 while ehrenfels and meinong agree on the intrinsic value with respect to desire or emotions, 
both consider that this essence can be predicated on objectively ascertained capacities of an object. 
ehrenfels, like dewey, makes a  distinction between valuing as mere praising, and valuation as appraisal. 
he considers the latter to be a value judgment. The ehrenfels-meinong controversy as  to  the  primacy 
of  desire or feeling in our  intrinsic value experience affected the work of r. B.  Perry and d. w. Prall. 
for both, values are rooted in our connotative and affective responses, that cannot be taken as isolated 
psychological datum as they originate from an ongoing transaction between ourselves and the different 
levels of environments. Perry’s approach is behavioristic, Prall’s introspective.
Perry’s general Theory of Value (1926) describes axiology in a systematic way, focusing on the meaning 
of value as interest. interest, for Perry, is  a  necessary condition for  “anything’s possessing or  
acquiring the quality of value...  for anything known to be valuable...”. Interest represents an activity 
rooted in reality. With his work Perry influenced Dewey’s axiological naturalism as he claimed that 
value is not merely a quality of an object nor a mere mental quality of  a  subject, but is a relation 
between an object and an interest-taking subject. on the other hand, Prall’s a  Study  in  the  Theory  
of  Value  (1921)  considers affective states, such  as  liking, hating, tasting, an  essential constituent 
of  value, albeit the value is more than an objectified feeling, because the affective state is predicated 
on ascertained qualities of  an object. Consequently,  Prall makes a  clear distinction between a mere 
subjective imputing of  valuational qualities and an objective imputing of  values where the latter is  
determined by  “the properties of things as well as by the properties of minds or bodies that see these 
things so  qualified, by physical conditions, in  other words.”
10 Moore, G. E. (1903), Principia Ethica, Cambridge, p. 184.
11 ibid., p. 3.
12 ibid., p. 173.
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goodness is a value independent of any desire or will on our side. like truth, 
the notion of goodness is unanalysable13. in this sense moore differs from 
Brentano, because Brentano gives an objective foundation to ethics in terms 
of the correctness of our acts of loving and hating.
nevertheless, thanks to the work of Brentano, values began to be emancipated 
from objects and their essence began to be considered analogous to objects 
that we can predicatively represent. The former analogy relates to the latter. 
in fact, if the ontological object differs from the axiological essence that 
overlays it, the ontological object can be described in a different way from 
the axiological one. on one hand, cognitive reason can say to us what the 
object is and its truthfulness in the world. on the other hand, the sentiment 
can perceive what we feel to be right or valuable from the same object. Both 
analogies are related to each other and address the direction of the research.
husserl began to attend Brentano’s courses “out of mere curiosity”14 in 1884/8515. 
what made him so curious was the public attention drawn by Brentano’s 
seminars. within a couple of years, as, ehrenfels wrote, husserl became “a 
new star” in Brentano’s circle,16 taking a number of classes held by Brentano, 
including two on Practical Philosophy. It is likely that under the influence 
exerted by Brentano’s moral teachings, Husserl began to reflect on the idea of a 
two-tiered analogy and parallelism. The first note17 we have about the analogy 
dates back to 1884, though on several occasions throughout the years, husserl 
worked out this idea and integrated it within his overall thought. as a matter 
of fact, amongst the volumes of husserliana we have,18 those that are entirely 
focused on ethics are very close to Brentano’s foundation and Construction of 
ethics, though they are developed in a different direction according to the due 
difference between Brentano’s and husserl’s philosophy.
13 ibid., p. 178.
14  Husserl, E. (1919/1986), “Erinnerungenan Franz Brentano” (1919). In gesammelte Werke, Bd. 
XXV, herausgegeben von Nenon, T Sepp H. R., Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, p. 305.
15 rollinger, robin d., husserl’s Position in the School of Brentano, dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999
16  see: reinhard fabian, ”lebenun wirken von christian von ehrenfels”. Christian von ehrenfels, 
leben und Werk, p. 17. (A letter from Ehrenfels to Meinong, 26 February 1886)
17  The first note we have about the parallelism dates back to 1902, though it was widened in 
Vorlesungen ueber grundfragenzur ethik und Wertlehere, namely in Vorlesungen ueber ethik in 1908-
09, 1911 and 1914. Also, see the letter from Husserl to Meinong 5 April 1902 (Briefwechsel, ed. 
schuhmann, K., the hague, Kluwer academic Publishers,1994, Bd. i, p. 145), and ideas i, note 1, p. 
219 and husserl, e. formale und transzendentale logik, ed. Janssen, P., The hague: martinus nijhoff, 
1974 note 1, p. 142.
18  Husserl, E. 1908-1914.Vorlesungen über ethik und Wertlehre,1908 - 1914, ulrich melle (ed.) 1988. 
The hague, Kluwer academic Publishers (abridged with hua XXViii) and husserl, e. einleitung 
in die ethik. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920 und 1924, hrsg. von h. Peucker, dordrecht/Boston/
London, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004 (abridged Hua XXXVII).
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husserl commences his analysis from the latter sense of the analogy, that 
is the one between logic and ethics, albeit always implying a reference to 
the analogy between axiology and ontology. indeed, in his lessons of 1914 
husserl enforces Brentano’s idea of analogy with the term parallelism. for 
husserl, as well as for Brentano, axiology is a science that relates to the realm 
of value, and it probably represents the pure rational core that can make 
ethics a pure science whose values can be as universal as logical truths19. for 
instance, positive value would correspond to a true statement and negative to 
its falseness.20 similarly to Brentano, he retains the same cartesian criterion 
of evidence to acknowledge the rightness of values and the same sense 
of axiological scale and proportion between values21. The second layer of 
Brentano’s analogy is transformed by husserl into an outright parallelism. 
In fact, Husserl writes: “This apparent parallelism—is not a merely apparent 
analogy, but rather, reflects a shared essential foundation—[therefore] we are 
able to assert that formal ethics and axiology are analogous to formal logic.”22 
according to husserl, analogy is something ‘radikal und durchgehende’23 
because both logic and ethics refer to the rationality of consciousness24.
Husserl defines consciousness as “a unit which goes under the name of reason: 
a reason that knows, values and acts.”25 every area of reason is committed to 
a specific function: knowing, willing, valuing. All these rational areas provide 
logic, ethics, axiology et al. with a rational basis. axiological reason, that 
is the reason in charge of processing values, is defined as a “consciousness 
which constitutes values objectivities.”26 logic and ethics or the true and good 
are parallel to each other because they are grounded in two different kinds 
of reason. according to husserl, to describe these essences we just have to 
explore the intentional act by which the consciousness experiences its objects.
as husserl wrote in his logical investigations (1900-01), every act of consciousness is 
either an intentional act that is based on a representation or is a representation27. 
19  hua XXViii, first section
20  Ibid., p. 240
21  See: Ibid., §10-12.
22 Ibid, p. 266.
23  hua XXViii, p. 44.
24 see: ibid., p. 4: ““since a system of fundamental structures of the consciousness of belief 
(doxic consciousness as i use to say) corresponds to the formal logic (....), similarly things are for 
the practic in relation to the phenomenological discipline that corresponds to them, that is the 
theory (...) of will.” 
25  husserl, e. (1922-1937). aufsätze und Vorträge 1922-1937, hrsg. nenon T. sepp h. r. in 
husserliana – Band XXVII. The Hague: Kluwer, 1997.
26  Hua XXVIII, p. 266.
27  Husserl, E. 1901. logical investigations findlay, J.n.(trans.) moran, d. (ed.) london: routledge, 
2001 (Original Husserl, E. 1901. logische untersuchungen, halle: niemeyer). abridged with hua XiX.
VAlUes, NORMATIVITy AND fACTs
susi ferrarello loyola university Chicago
174
This means that consciousness refers to its objects by intending them. This is 
distinct from Brentano’s claim that intentionality is not object-oriented, rather it 
is subject-oriented as it is up to consciousness to “decide”28 what it wants to mean. 
The intentional essence, similarly to what Brentano also claimed, is composed 
of quality, matter and representative content29. every intentional act can aim at 
different contents in different ways but intentional acts always need a signitive 
or intellective act to present or understand what consciousness is aiming at. for 
example, i can feel the beauty of a sunset only if i can represent the presence of 
that sunset to myself. i can know a friend if i can represent her presence before 
me. Consequently, this means that the intentional essence of every act is based on 
the representation of the object. 
“We can talk about a pure understanding (…) when the acts that we define 
as (…) perceptions, representations, judgments, suppositions, conjectures, 
doubts can be thought without the interference of affective acts at all. (…) on the 
other hand affective acts, according to their essence, look to be grounded 
acts and grounded in intellective acts. every intellective act is based upon 
(…) a represented object which is established as an existent one.”30
The intentional essence of an axiological act is always made up of 
representative content, matter and quality where this specific quality 
is often explained by husserl with the metaphor of colors. axiological 
intentions are, to use his words, “emotionally coloured.”31
“a sensation of pleasure attaches to the idea, a sensation at once seen and 
located as an emotional excitement in the psycho-physical feeling subject, 
and also as an objective property (…) The event thus pleasingly painted 
now serves as the first foundation for the joyful approach (…). The sad event 
seems coloured and clothed with sadness”32
The axiological essence is a hue that attaches to the representation of the 
ontological object to which it refers. in this sense, the two layers of the 
analogy and parallelism are, for husserl, related to each other. The analogy 
28  see: husserl, e. analyses concerning active and Passive Synthesis, trans. by a. steinbock, 
Dordrecht: Springer, 2001, p. 134: “The noetic (subjective) yes and no […] arises from taking 
a position specifically as judging. As with every mode of consciousness, we have a noematic 
(objective) correlate. here, of course, this correlate is the noematic valid and invalid arising in the 
objective sense” 
29  Hua XIX, p. 461.
30  hua XXViii, p. 252.
31  hua XiX, p. 111.
32  Hua XIX, pp. 110-111.
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between the true and good leads the way to the former layer of the analogy 
between the axiological essence and the object. The former analogy, in fact, 
shows that there are two analogous kinds of intentionality, both grounded 
in the representation of the object (though in two different ways). The 
ontological object differs from the object that exists in the consciousness 
because of its signitive representation. The good, as well as the true, exists 
as a ‘primary object’, i.e. as an ontological object that is in front of me and 
as a ‘secondary object’ cognitively given to my mind. without the “all-
encompassing”33 device of predicative reason we cannot explain what we are 
referring to, nor can we even be aware of our practical intentionality. 
Therefore, following the former layer of analogy, Husserl defines value as 
a state of affairs that differs from the object that holds the value. in fact, 
the object of value (primary object) that we normally perceive differs 
from the moral value (secondary object) because the latter is enriched by 
the affective intentional hue which is parallel to the hue of ‘logic’. “Values 
are objects (…) that have to be constituted in kinds of acts belonging to a 
coherent and particular class of acts that we define as acts of knowledge.”34 
apparently “evaluative acts are essential to the constitution of values”, 
but only when the object is already given. “The value is not the being; the 
value is something connected to the being (…) but in another dimension. 
The state of value (Werthalte) itself is not just a state of affairs”35 but it is a 
directed and teleological being in a new normative sense. The second layer 
of the parallelism pertains to this second teleological level. This “practical” 
direction seems to be what makes the difference between a simple 
judgment and an evaluation, at the lowest level of any evaluation. Value, as 
a secondary object, is ‘a hue’ which is later added to the act as the direction 
in itself. “a sensation of pleasure attaches to the idea, as a sensation at once 
seen and located as an emotional excitement in the psycho-physical feeling 
subject, and also as an objective property (…) The event thus pleasingly 
painted now serves as the first foundation for the joyful approach (…). The 
sad event seems coloured and clothed with sadness”36
according to the logical investigations(1900-01)and the lectures on Value 
Theory (1914), values are essences grounded in practical feelings and 
addressed toward a direction that is parallel to the logical one.  
33  hua XXViii, p. 57.
34  hua XXViii, p. 277.
35  Hua XXVIII, p. 340.
36  Ibid., p. 110-11.
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in this sense ideas and ideals, cognitive notions and axiological essences, 
are parallel to each other and at the same time blend together within the 
representation of the ‘state of affairs’ (Sachlage) of their objects. from this 
perspective, a question is raised that we will deal with in the following 
section: what is the role of norms in these logical and axiological essences?
What is the role of norms in this pattern? What is the relationship between 
normativity and values? At a first sight norms seem to have no role within 
the structure of a value, especially in husserl’s system, as values spring 
from a sentiment that cannot be normed. it consists of a Wertnehmung, i. e. a 
perception of what one is feeling.
under this perspective, a value does not need a norm in order to be a value. 
intuitively we could say that a friendship does not need norms in order to 
be so or to be worth of values. for example, we did not need the norms of 
three generations of human rights in order to recognize the value of those 
principles. rather, these three generations of norms are the outcome of 
what people felt throughout the ages and what generations fought for in 
order to find new norms able to define a new rising identity. Norms seem to 
describe the signitive representation of what we feel as a value, rather than 
the value in itself.
on this point we can cite a passage of the logical investigations in which 
husserl describes the role of norms in relation to values. “a warrior must 
be brave.”37 The sense of this norm is related to desire or to a value as a kind 
of request. A warrior, in order to be a warrior, has to satisfy an x, i.e. being 
brave. Being brave can be described according to some specific predicates. 
Courage is a cognitive idea that is required not for the value in itself, but out 
of the representation needed to describe a warrior.
Consequently, normativity does not belong to the essence of the value, 
but to the essence of the representation and the description we hold 
about a specific status quo. you must obey me if you want to be as good as i 
imagined you to be. The value, in its inner structure, is a teleological essence 
grounded in a feeling which points to an end whose meaning can be shared 
only after being represented.
A crucifix cannot be an object worthy of respect unless we do not project onto it a 
shared feeling of respect which implies a code of norms intersubjectively shared. 
37  hua XiX, p. 57.
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There is a beautiful article from Hartman -- who was influenced by Moore and 
indirectly by Brentano’s school --38, in which he distinguishes facts from values 
and, accordingly, norms from values. “fact,  thus,  we  said,  was the  primary  
property  of  value.  we  usually  see  only  the  factual  nature  of  fact  and  not  its 
valuational  normativity.”39 Yet a fact, to be a fact, needs norms that define it and 
yet the same thing cannot be said for values. Values need ontological facts in order 
to be expressed but they do not need normativity in order to be values.
To give another example taken from hartman: “we have a magic wand in our 
hand, but it is just another stick. formal  axiology  arrives  at  a  copernican  
inversion  of  fact  and value:  rather  than  value  being  a  kind  of  fact,  fact  
is  a  kind of value;  rather  than  value  being  the  norm  of  fact,  fact  is  the  
norm of  value;  rather  than  fact  being  real  and  value  unreal,  value  is 
real  and  fact  is  unreal.  Value  is  the  reality  of  which  fact  is  the measure.  
fact  is  to  value  as  a measuring  rod  is  to  a mountain.  it measures  the  
mountain,  but  that  is  all.”40 The phenomenological analysis highlights an 
inversion of the relationship between values and norms. fact is something 
that remains unreal until the value can describe how norms can feature it. 
a magic wand remains a stick until our feelings can be processed and can 
express predicatively what defines this stick as a magic wand. A fact remains 
unreal if we do not have normative and axiological words to make it real. 
axiologists who employed the aristotelian procedure “repeated ad  nauseam  
the  Kantian  distinction,  which  is  a  distinction  of secondary  value  
properties  and  obstructs  to  this  day  the  true understanding  of  value.”41
from  this  it  follows  that  it  is misleading  to  base  value on oughtness or 
normativity.  Values are the primary properties for facts and descriptions 
are the primary property for values. hence, the oughtness is a feeling that 
can be described and lead to those norms that define a fact.
38  hartman read moore’s Principia (1903)and in his work was directly influenced by Moore and 
his school. it is not the case that he refers to the husserl of Crisis as one who was “closest  to  the  
solution  here  presented. hartman cited husserl’s well-known volume of the Crisis, noticing how 
this division of norms and values made possible the development of science. These authors move 
within the same atmosphere as Brentano’s school.
39  hartman, r. s. “the logic of description and Valuation”, in The review of metaphysics, Vol. 14, 
No. 2 (Dec., 1960), p. 204.
40 Ibid., p. 206.
41 Ibid., pp. 205-6.
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The confusion between norms and values and facts and descriptions can be 
attributed to the two-tiered parallelism. Before Brentano, many axiologists 
did not distinguish values and objects or values and meanings. This two-
tiered analogy or parallelism, if seen under husserl’s lens, allows us to 
observe the essence of values independently of the normativity that it 
entails. The value is not the same as the object, though we need the object 
in order to express the value, and the value is not the true, though we need 
the representation of something that appears true in order to perceive it 
as a value. Consequently axiology is not a moral discipline that says to us 
what we have to do, but it should be a kind of mathematical discipline that 
describes the measure of what we feel. 
as husserl in the Crisis and, independently from him, other authors such 
as hartman or Bernstein note 42, if facts are bearers of normativity and 
if normativity is connected to values, we undertake the risk to consider 
facts the only reliable judge of what is good and wrong. rather, we need to 
separate values from normativity, otherwise the (essential or empirical) 
facts will become the judge of what is valuable without leaving room for 
the search for a lifeworld more respondent to our own identity. in fact, 
to use husserl’s words, the teleological hue of values makes axiology a 
science with no moral boundaries but rather a ‘liquid’ discipline deeply 
more fit to the ‘liquidity’ of our practical life43. This allows us to describe 
our epistemological, aesthetical and logical identity according to an 
intersubjective changing view of the life-world.
42  Bernstein, r. J., Beyond Objectivism and relativism, Philadelphia, university of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1991; husserl, e. Crisis of european Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, ed. by carr, 
D. Evanston: Northwestern Press, 1970; Hartman, R. S., “Axiology as a Science”, in Philosophy of 
Science, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Oct., 1962), pp. 412-433. 
43  Bauman, Z. liquid modernity, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000.
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